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A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information 
regarding the seller’s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This 
widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. 
Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with 
larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma 
Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state’s internal estimate of the costs to 
complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis 
comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information 
all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma.  Our results show that, in 
comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ 
cost estimate (ECE) policy.  This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common 
uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after 
the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with 
greater common cost uncertainty.   
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A fundamental result from auction theory is that the public release of information 
regarding the valuation of an object can lead to more aggressive bidding behavior (see 
Milgrom and Weber (1982), Harstad (1990), and Campbell and Levin (2000)).  In a 
competitive environment, the release of information can intensify competition among 
bidders by making values more predictable.  This effect is pronounced in auctions of 
objects with common value uncertainty (Goeree and Offerman (2003)).  Public 
information can also lower the relative value of a bidder’s own private information thus 
reducing his rents.  These predictions are widely accepted but remain largely untested 
using field auction data.  For the most part, the empirical evidence on the impact of 
public information dissemination is confined to laboratory experiments (see Kagel, 
Harstad and Levin (1987), Goeree and Offerman (2002), and Kagel, Levin and Harstad 
(1995)).
1   
This study examines the role of information release on bidding behavior using data 
from highway construction procurement auctions. Each state in the US conducts 
transportation procurement auctions and billions of dollars of construction projects are 
awarded annually through this process.  The auctions are first-price sealed bid auctions 
and are held in each state at regular intervals throughout the year.  While the auction 
format is quite similar in most states, a feature that varies across states is the information 
provided to bidders regarding the state’s internal estimate of the cost of a project.
2  Some 
states release this information prior to bidding and others do not.  Oklahoma recently 
changed its policy in this regard.  Prior to the change in policy, it was illegal for state 
officials to disclose the state’s cost estimate before bids were opened.  During a six 
month period beginning at the end of 1999, the Oklahoma Legislature initiated a set of 
changes to state laws that overturned this policy.  Bidders now have access to the state’s 
cost estimate prior to bid submission.  This change in Oklahoma’s information policy is 
                                                           
1 The results from experiments performed in Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) and Goeree and Offerman 
(2002) agree with the predictions of Milgrom and Weber (1982). Alternatively, Kagel, Levin and Harstad 
(1995) show that in some experiments when the bidders’ behavior is out of the equilibrium path such policy 
prescriptions fail. 
2 This is called the engineers’ cost estimate and is used as a benchmark to judge the submitted bids.  For 
example, in Oklahoma, the state uses the engineers’ cost estimate to establish a reserve value for a project 
and if the low bid is seven percent above the engineers’ cost estimate, the state may reject the low bid and 
re-auction the project off at a later time. 
  2similar, in spirit, to the information release discussed in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and 
this information policy change forms the basis of our test of the theory.   
As mentioned above, the existing evidence on the effect of public information release 
in auctions is quite limited and is mostly coming from experiments.  The empirical 
literature’s closest evidence is of simulations of a public information disclosure.  In a 
study of open auctions of apartments in Sweden, Eklof and Lunander (2003) estimate the 
distribution of private values when the reserve prices are secret.  They then simulate the 
effect of moving to an open reserve price mechanism and find that the seller’s revenue 
would be about 10% higher if the reserve price was announced.  The empirical studies of 
drainage auctions examine how asymmetries in the precision of the bidders’ information 
affect their bidding behavior (see Hendricks and Porter (1988) and Hendricks, Porter, and 
Wilson (1994)).  The focus is generally placed on studying the magnitude of information 
rents in asymmetric environments when one bidder can acquire better information than 
others (see Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987) and Porter (1995)).
3  I n  w i l d c a t  
auctions where information is relatively symmetric, there is some evidence that royalty 
schemes that provide revenue insurance increase bids. In Treasury bill auctions, Nyborg, 
Rydquist and Sundaresan (2002) show that increased market volatility can lead to lower 
demand, lower prices and increased dispersion of bids. Part of this behavior is due to risk 
aversion.  In a study of computer auctions on Ebay, Yin (2005) examines the effect of 
value dispersion and seller reputation on prices.  She finds that the seller's reputation 
complements information provided by the auction site by lending more credibility to it.  
However, none of these empirical papers provides a direct test of Milgrom and Weber’s 
hypothesis that the provision of public information regarding the valuation of an item 
affects bidding behavior.   
To this end, we empirically examine the impact of the release of public information in 
Oklahoma auctions using a differences-in-differences approach and compare the changes 
in bidding behavior in auctions held in Oklahoma and Texas.  Texas had a uniform 
                                                           
3 Athey and Levin (2001) provide another example of an asymmetric environment in timber auctions.  They 
show how bidders strategically use their private information in bidding.  A recent theoretical study by 
Mares and Harstad (2003) relates the two strands of literature by examining the benefits of private 
information disclosure to a subset of bidders and compares those to the benefits of public disclosure of 
information.  
  3information release policy throughout the entire period and we use the Texas auctions as 
a control group.  The data include over 13,000 submitted bids by construction firms in 
Oklahoma and Texas over the period 1998-2003.  Our empirical analysis provides 
evidence in support of the theory; the average level of bids is lower after the release of 
additional information.  Despite the competitive pressure created by the information 
release, the lower average bids do not result in statistically significant lower winning 
bids.   
The theory suggests that the effects of information release should be more apparent in 
auctions with a greater degree of common cost uncertainty.  Within the set of auctions 
used in this analysis, we isolate two types of projects that appear to differ significantly in 
the level of common cost uncertainty associated with the specific construction tasks.  The 
two project types are asphalt paving projects and bridge construction/repair work.  We 
argue that in asphalt projects one has to rely more on the individual firm's state of 
equipment and internal efficiency to determine the cost, while in bridgework projects 
there is more uncertainty that is common to all bidders.
4  We find, in agreement with the 
theory, that the effect of information release is stronger for bridgework projects. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that studies and compares the impact of a public 
information release among auctions with different degrees of common cost uncertainty.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the bidding 
process and presents the theoretical framework.  Section III provides a description of the 
data while Sections IV and V report the results. In Section VI, we offer some concluding 
comments. 
 
II. INFORMATION POLICY & AUCTIONS 
OKLAHOMA ECE POLICY CHANGE 
Before November 1999, the law in Oklahoma explicitly prohibited the release of the 
state’s engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) prior to bid letting.  In fact, very few people within 
                                                           
4 We discuss below the differences in the uncertainty of costs associated with asphalt and bridge work.  In 
short, asphalt paving projects are relatively straightforward as the job descriptions typically specify an area 
of roadwork to be surfaced, a depth of surfacing required, and the material to be used in the surfacing 
project.  In bridgework, there is more uncertainty.  Soil conditions at a site may not be fully known until 
excavation work begins and repairs may not be fully understood until some demolition work is undertaken.    
  4the Department of Transportation (DOT) were entrusted with this information and it was 
a felony offense to release the estimate.  In November 1999, the law was changed.  The 
Oklahoma statute (OS 61, section 116) was amended to include the phrase "The public 
agency's engineering estimate of the actual cost of the project shall not be considered 
confidential and shall be open for public inspection."  Bidders could now request access 
to the ECE prior to bid letting.  In April 2000, the legislature amended the section further 
to state that the ECE "shall be available to the public in accordance to the Oklahoma 
Open Records Act."  This change allowed the full release of the details of the ECE to all 
potential bidders.  
Table 1 shows the current ECE release policy for individual states.  Only eight states 
release the actual estimates, either with their advertisement of the projects or upon 
request.  Five states provide a total "budgeted" amount that may include costs that are not 
part of the bid amount.  Fourteen states release a range of possible costs instead of the 
actual estimate.  Twenty-three states do not release the engineering estimate before the 
bid letting.  Of those, eight do not release it even after the bids are opened.  
Oklahoma is not the only state that has enacted changes in ECE policy.  There have 
been recent shifts in ECE policy in Florida, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Utah and 
Illinois.  Prior to these recent changes, Florida and New Hampshire did not provide any 
estimates of the ECE before or after bid letting, and North Carolina and Utah released the 
ECE only after bids were opened.  Currently, New Hampshire and Utah release the ECE 
prior to bidding (as in Oklahoma) and Florida and North Carolina provide a budgeted 
amount that is based on the ECE prior to bid letting.  Alternatively, Illinois changed its 
policy in the opposite direction, restricting access to the ECE, and state authorities in 
Michigan are also considering a similar policy change.  
INFORMATION RELEASE AND AUCTION THEORY 
In first-price sealed bid auctions with affiliated values, Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
have shown that the release of public information induces more competitive bidding and 
may result in higher revenues.  In theorem 16, they state that "In a first price auction a 
policy of publicly revealing the seller's information cannot lower and may raise the 
expected price."
5  In a competitive environment, the release of information can have two 
                                                           
5 See also Theorem 5.4.18 in Milgrom (2004). 
  5effects on bidding behavior.  First, it can reduce the impact of the bidder's own private 
information on his estimate of the value and, as a result, reduce his information rents.  
Second, it can make values more predictable thus encouraging more intense competition 
from all bidders.  
To formalize the role of public information in auctions, we present a simple model of 
competitive bidding with additive and separable common and private cost components.  
This model, first introduced by Goeree and Offerman (2003), provides useful directions 
for the empirical analysis that follows.  The framework produces a simple bidding 
function with the added advantage that it allows us to assess the relative magnitude of the 
impact of an information release when the size of the common cost component relative to 
the private cost component changes.  We can also provide an explanation for the 
observed difference in the impact that the release of information has on projects with 
predominantly private costs (such as asphalt), and projects with predominantly common 
costs (such as bridgework).  Finally, due to its simplicity, the framework can predict 
effects on the variance of bids.  
There are n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders who compete for a government contract in a first 
price sealed bid auction.  The cost of the contract to a bidder, i, consists of two 
components: the private cost component ci and the common cost component V.  Each one 
of the n bidders has an unbiased estimate, vi, of the true common cost.  The common cost 
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The private and common cost estimates are identically and independently distributed 
across bidders.  The density of the private cost c to bidder i is f  that is strictly positive on 
the support [c , c ].  Similarly, the density of the common cost component is f  and it is 
strictly positive on its support [v , v ].  We assume that the densities f and f are 
logconcave.
i c
L   H v
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6 This modeling framework has been previously used in many theoretical papers such as Albers and Harstad (1991), 
Bikhchandani and Riley (1991), Vincent (1995), Klemperer (1998), Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999), and Goeree 
and Offerman (2003).  Alternatively, in the more traditional formulation adopted by Wilson (1969), bidders draw their 
signals from a known distribution conditional on the realization of V.  These two formulations have the same 
qualitative features (see also the discussion in Goeree and Offerman (2003) and Milgrom (2004)).    
7 The assumption of logconcavity is discussed in detail in Goeree and Offerman (2003).  It guarantees that a lower 
privately observed cost implies, on average, a lower overall cost thus ensuring monotonicity and existence.  
  6In this environment, a bidder who is awarded a contract at a bid of bi receives a net 
profit of bi–ci–V.  The following strategy is the unique symmetric equilibrium bidding 
strategy for bidder i in the first price auction: 
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where   i s  i's privately observed component of the cost and y i i i c n v s + = / 1 is the lowest 
value of the remaining n-1 estimates of s. This function is derived in appendix A.  An 
alternative way to express this bidding function for any estimate x  of the privately 
observed component of the cost is: 
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where Y1 is the lowest estimate of s among all bidders.  The first term of this expression 
represents the bidder's estimate of the expected value of the total cost, and the second 
term is the potential information rent of the bidder.  As a result, each bid is an estimate of 
the entire cost increased by the private information rent.   
The seller can also obtain an estimate of the common cost V.  If he decides to obtain 
and release that estimate to the bidders, the value of n increases by one and the weight 
placed upon any privately observed signal becomes lower, i i i c n v s + + = ) 1 /( .  As a 
result, the private information rents are reduced and bidders bid relatively more 
aggressively.  The larger the relative size of the common cost component, the more 
aggressive the bidding behavior is expected to be after the information is released.  If the 
seller's estimate carried a larger weight than any other estimate, his decision to acquire 
and release it to bidders would reduce the private information rents even more leading to 
lower bids on average. With the release of that information all bidders get to learn the 
state’s estimated value of the common cost.
8 Bids become more concentrated as the 
information rents are reduced at every level of bid.   
                                                           
8 Indeed, according to a discussion with a state official the engineering estimate obtained by the state is not 
unveiling the true common cost but is rather another estimate that involves some amount of uncertainty as 
well. This is a feature that we were hoping to capture in our modeling effort.  
  7To recap, the release of information is likely to induce aggressive bidding behavior.  
The larger the common value component of the cost, the lower the bids and the lower the 
variance of bids is expected to be after the information is released.  On the other hand, if 
the costs were purely private, in a competitive environment, the release of information 
would have no effect on the bids.  Our empirical analysis will perform three tests of this 
theory.  First, we will estimate the overall effect of the change in ECE policy on bids and 
winning bids.  Second, we will estimate the effects of the change in ECE policy on 
projects with differing levels of common and private cost components.  We expect that 
the change in ECE policy will more greatly affect the bidding in project types with larger 
common cost components.  Third, we model the variance of bids as a function of the 
change in policy.  We expect variances to decline after the change in ECE policy. 
Throughout this discussion, it is assumed that the competitive environment is 
maintained.  One concern raised by transportation officials is that the release of the ECE 
may result in less competitive bidding environments.  Clearly, collusion has been a 
problem in this industry in the past (Porter and Zona (1993)) and the federal government 
has put together guidelines for the detection and prevention of collusive behavior.  With 
regard to the state’s ECE, the guidelines recommend that states not make the information 
available prior to the award of the contract.  The rationale for this recommendation is that 
the release of the ECE may “encourage and facilitate bid rigging.”
9  If such a change in 
competitive environment occurred due to the change in ECE policy, then this would 
weaken our test of the theoretical predictions.  To be sure, we know of no prosecution of 
bid rigging in the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) auctions during the 
time period under analysis.  
 
III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
  This study employs data obtained from the Oklahoma and Texas (TXDOT) 
Departments of Transportation on auctions of construction projects for the period 
                                                           
9  This recommendation and rationale are discussed in Suggestions for the Detection and Prevention of 
Construction Bid Rigging (1983) authored by the US Department of Transportation and the US Department 
of Justice (see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/contracts/dotjbid.htm.). 
  8between January 1998 and August 2003.
10  The data include auctions from the entire state 
of Oklahoma and from the North Texas and Panhandle construction districts in Texas.  
These areas of Texas border on Oklahoma, have similar topography and soil conditions, 
and use similar grades of construction materials as those in Oklahoma.
11  For each project 
auctioned off, we know the contractors that purchased plans (plan holders), the bids 
submitted by each contractor if they bid, the winning bidder, and the winning bid.  In 
addition, both states provide data describing each project.  The data give the location, a 
detailed description of the tasks, the estimated time to completion and, most importantly, 
the ECE for each project.  With this information, we construct a panel data set on bidders 
where an observation in our data set represents a plan held and possibly a bid submitted 
by a bidder for a given project.  Bidders may place multiple individual bids in a month or 
may elect not to bid at all in some months; hence, the panel structure is quite unbalanced.    
The top two panels of Table 2 provide a summary of the auction data for Texas and 
Oklahoma broken out by the ECE policy information periods described above–January 
1998-October 1999, November 1999-March 2000, and April 2000-August 2003.  The 
table includes statistics on the number of auctions, bidders, and values of bids submitted.  
The information on bids is presented as the relative bid which is measured as the bid 
divided by the engineering cost estimate.
12  This allows for a direct comparison of bids 
across projects of different sizes.  Three points are worth noting.  First, the sample is 
relatively balanced between Oklahoma and Texas with slightly fewer auctions in Texas 
compared to Oklahoma in each of the three periods.  Second, participation levels, both in 
terms of the number of plan holders and the number of bidders, are generally higher in 
Texas compared with Oklahoma.  On average, the number of bidders in Texas exceeds 
that in Oklahoma by .5 to 1.0 bidders per auction.  Third, it appears that, in both 
                                                           
10 The Oklahoma dataset is obtained from three reports in the ODOT website, namely the as read bid report, 
the low bid report, and the award notice.  The Texas data are provided by the TXDOT.  We use the 1997 
data to initialize variables on bidding history and capacity utilization that are discussed more fully below. 
11 We use all well-defined project types (i.e., asphalt, concrete, bridge, traffic signal, grade and 
drainage/grading projects) in both states but exclude miscellaneous projects.   Miscellaneous projects are 
typically smaller projects that may involve such tasks as mowing, painting, sign replacement, and 
construction at rest stops.  
12 Bajari and Ye (2003) also analyze highway procurement auctions focusing on the relative bids as their 
measure of bids in an auction.  Alternatively, some studies use the log of the bids in their study.  We 
estimate our models both ways but report mainly the relative bid results.  With regard to ECE policy 
variables, the relative bid and log of the bids models give qualitatively similar results across our different 
specifications. 
  9Oklahoma and Texas, relative bids and relative winning bids have declined over time but 
the decline is more marked in Oklahoma.  This last point is reflected in Figures 1 and 2.  
Figure 1 presents the kernel density plots for the relative bid distributions for the three 
ECE periods for Oklahoma, and Figure 2 shows the same set of distributions for Texas.  
In Oklahoma, the leftward shift of the distribution is considerably more pronounced.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
Our first test of the effect of the change in information release policy in Oklahoma 
will take a panel-data differences-in-differences approach.  We will compare the changes 
in bidding behavior in Oklahoma and Texas.  In Texas, there was no change in policy 
with the ECE being available to bidders prior to bid letting for the entire sample.  In 
Oklahoma, there was a distinct change in the policy as described above.  We will model 
this change in information by classifying our auctions into three distinct time periods–
pre-November 1999, November 1999-March 2000, and post-March 2000.  In the first 
period, the ECE for Oklahoma projects is not known prior to the bid letting.  The second 
time interval is a period of transition and encompasses the two changes in legislation that 
occurred in November of 1999 and March of 2000.  In the final time period, the ECE is 
available to bidders and both legislative changes have been enacted.  We will estimate a 
differences-in-differences model that allows for differential effects across the three time 
















3 2 1  (3) 
 
where the unit of observation is firm i bidding in auction a in time period t.  The 
dependent variable is the relative bid defined above and the β’s measure the change in 
bidding that occurs between Texas and Oklahoma across the three ECE policy periods.  
The coefficient on Dt
OK,  β1, measures the average difference in bidding between 
Oklahoma and Texas auctions.  The coefficients, β2 and β4, capture the average difference 
in bidding in auctions during the transition period and after the ECE policy change 
period, respectively.  β3 measures the difference in bidding that occurs in Oklahoma 
auctions compared to Texas auctions during the transition period and β5 measures the 
  10difference in bidding that occurs in Oklahoma auctions compared to Texas auctions in the 
period after the ECE policy-change.  Our main interest is on the coefficient β5.  If the 
theory is applicable to these data, we expect that β5 should be negative.  β3 is more 
difficult to make predictions about since the ECE policy changes are not fully enacted 
until the end of the time period. In fact, the actual policies are in flux until the passage of 
the Opens Record Act provision. A crucial requirement is that we control for any 
additional factors that could differentially impact Oklahoma auctions compared to Texas 
auctions in the later periods in order to interpret β5 as reflecting the change in ECE 
information policy.  All models will include bidder fixed effects (αi’s) as well as a set of 
controls (X’s) for bidder, rival, auction, and business conditions variables.
13  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
The main dependent variable used throughout the analysis is the relative bid though 
we do present a number of specifications using the log of the bid as the dependent 
variable.  The independent variables can be classified into five main groups–ECE 
information policy controls, auction characteristics, bidder characteristics, rival 
characteristics and business environment characteristics.  Table B1 in appendix B 
provides a detailed definition for each of the variables used in the study.  There are two 
auction-level variables – the number of bidders and a set of project type dummies.  The 
number of bidders controls for differences in competition in auctions and the project type 
dummies control for the fact that we observe differences in bidding across project 
categories. We include two bidder characteristic variables, in addition to firm fixed 
effects, that measure the cost heterogeneity of bidders – the bidder’s capacity utilization 
rate and the bidder’s distance to a project.  As a bidder’s capacity utilization rises or as a 
bidder’s distance to a project increases, we expect a bidder to submit higher bids.  Three 
variables that measure rival characteristics are also constructed.  First, we utilize past 
information on rivals’ bidding success and construct the average winning percentage of 
                                                           
13 Our models are estimated with firm fixed effects to control for bidder heterogeneity.  A related model has 
been estimated in the literature using auction fixed effects but that is not possible here because the ECE 
policy control variables do not vary within auctions.   To check how our data compare to other papers that 
estimate the reduced form bid model with auction fixed effects, we replicated the relative bid model 
reported in Bajari and Ye (2003).  Our results are quite similar in spirit to Bajari and Ye (2003).  Relative 
bids increase with a firm’s distance to a project and decline when firms have more prior production 
experience and when rivals are close to the project.  The one difference is that we did not find a statistically 
significant effect for a firm’s capacity utilization on bids.    
  11all rival plan holders in an auction.  This is a measure of rival toughness.  If firms face a 
set of tough rivals, we expect them to bid more aggressively.  Second, we include the 
rivals’ minimum distance to the project and the minimum backlog of the rivals.  These 
variables are also used to control for rival cost heterogeneity and are similar to variables 
used by Bajari and Ye (2003).
 14  
In the analysis that follows, it is important to control for factors that change over time 
other than the ECE information.  Three variables are included that control for the 
business environment: (1) the monthly variation in the amount of projects being let, (2) 
the monthly unemployment rate, and (3) the monthly building permits.  The first variable 
measures the real volume of projects auctioned off in each state in each month.  The 
aggregate real volume of projects auctioned off in a month and in a state will vary due to 
budgetary conditions and seasonal factors.  This may affect bidding behavior if firms bid 
more or less aggressively as the relative real volume of projects being let changes.  The 
time-series plot of the quarterly series for both Texas and Oklahoma is shown in Figure 3.  
The graph shows that the real volume of projects in Oklahoma peaked in the middle part 
of our sample and has fallen off compared to Texas toward the latter half of 2002.  Two 
additional variables are included to control for business conditions that vary over time 
and may affect bidding–the state unemployment rate and the state building permits.  We 
expect that as unemployment or building permits change over time firms’ non-state 
construction activity may fluctuate and this may affect bidding on state projects.  Figure 4 
shows how the unemployment rate varies over the sample period for Oklahoma and 
Texas.  Oklahoma’s unemployment rate is somewhat lower than Texas’s unemployment 
rate but the time series patterns are quite similar across the two series.  In the regression 
models, we include the three-month moving average for the permits and real volume of 
projects series along with the concurrent unemployment rate.  Summary statistics of all 
the regression variables are presented in Table B2. 
DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES RESULTS 
All the differences-in-differences models are estimated with firm fixed effects and 
include a set of monthly dummy variables along with the controls for bidder, rival, 
                                                           
14 See also Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000), De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003), and De Silva, 
Jeitschko and Kosmopoulou (2005).   
  12business conditions and auction characteristics discussed above.  The standard errors 
reported are cluster-robust standard errors where the clustering is on firms. We estimate 
the models on two samples of bids.  One sample includes all bids submitted and our 
results will measure how changes in ECE policy influence overall bidding behavior.  A 
second sample estimates the model using only winning bids and these runs will assess 
how the change in ECE policy relates to the winning bid.  These latter regressions 
measure more directly the effect of the ECE policy change on Oklahoma’s procurement 
costs.   
Table 3 reports the results for our base model.  The first column presents the 
coefficients for the base model using all relative bids and the second column presents the 
estimates from the sample restricted to the winning relative bids.  The first set of 
coefficients in the table is the policy response controls.  The key parameter of interest in 
this group is β5 that measures the difference in bidding between Oklahoma and Texas 
auctions in the period after the ECE policy change (post-March 2000).  Two clear 
patterns emerge.  On average, bidding is lower in Oklahoma after the change in ECE 
policy by about 5.0 percent.  With regard to the winning bids (column 2), there is no 
statistically significant effect of the change in ECE policy on the observed winning bids.  
Alternatively, in the transition period when ECE policies were being changed, there is no 
difference in bidding between Oklahoma and Texas.  The last two columns report the 
results where the log of the bid is used as the dependent variable and the log of the ECE 
is used as a control variable.  The findings are quite similar to the models estimated with 
the relative bid as dependent variable.  The log of the bids is lower in period after ECE 
policy change though there is no effect on winning bids. 
With regard to the other variables in the model, the number of bidders appears to have 
the most consistent impact.  As the number of bidders increases, bidding becomes more 
aggressive and winning bids fall.  Therefore, increased competition results in lower 
procurement costs for the states.  If the winner has a higher capacity utilization rate, bids 
tend to be higher.  The only rival variable that consistently matters is the average rival 
winning to plan holder ratio.  As rivals get tougher, bids generally decline.  The variables 
that measure business conditions show mixed results.  As unemployment rises, bidding 
becomes more aggressive resulting in lower winning bids.  This may reflect the fact that 
  13the firms non-highway business has weakened and they become more aggressive in 
bidding on procurement contracts.  Alternatively, we expected to see less aggressive 
bidding as the volume of projects being let increased.  This is not the case.  Firms appear 
to bid somewhat more aggressively as the volume of projects increases although, again, 
there is no effect on the winning bids.  The effect of a rise in building permits is not 
statistically significantly in most of the specifications.   
PROJECT DIFFERENCES 
The main results in Table 3 show a significant change in the average bidding behavior 
after the ECE policy change but no effect on winning bids.  While the results in Table 3 
offer an overall assessment of the impact of the change in ECE policy on bidding 
behavior in Oklahoma procurement auctions, the sample pools across projects with very 
different construction components.  The theoretical literature in auctions suggests that the 
ECE information effect should be more pronounced in auctions where there is greater 
uncertainty about the cost.  To examine the potential differences in the effect of ECE 
policy across projects, we look at two specific project types, asphalt and bridge work, 
where we think the relative importance of the common value components differ and 
where we have significant numbers of projects.  Based on discussions with state highway 
and civil engineers, we believe that asphalt projects appear best described by the 
independent private value framework.  Differences in bids submitted are primarily due to 
differences in private costs and there is less uncertainty in the costs involved.  This is 
because asphalt projects are generally straightforward, requiring a contractor to lay down 
a certain thickness and type of asphalt across a specific road surface.  For these projects, 
the quantities and types of material defined in the work items are usually well specified.   
On the other hand, the costs associated with bridge construction and repair are often 
more uncertain.  Each bridge is different and bridge construction projects will differ in 
complexity.  Moreover, bridge work may require demolition and excavation in order to 
fully understand the costs of the job.  The state construction engineers and civil engineers 
we spoke with generally thought that some costs associated with bridge work such as 
demolition and pier construction were more uncertain than the cost components typically 
observed in asphalt projects.  The uncertainties may be due to the difficulties in assessing 
  14soil conditions or discerning the exact repairs that must be done to an existing bridge.
15  
Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics for the asphalt and bridge work samples.   
Looking at the table, several patterns emerge.  While all bids fall over time, there is a 
strong decline in the average relative bids in the bridge work category, especially in 
Oklahoma.  The standard deviation of relative bids is also much higher in bridge work as 
compared to asphalt projects in both Texas and Oklahoma.  Finally, the standard 
deviation in bridge work declines more sharply across time in Oklahoma compared with 
Texas. These patterns are certainly consistent with our story that bridge work projects 
contain more uncertain cost components and that the uncertainty is declining in 
Oklahoma.
16   
Our test will be to estimate a differences-in-differences model on asphalt and bridge 
projects separately using the same specification as presented in Table 3.
17  We expect to 
see a larger effect of the change in the ECE policy in the bridge project sample as 
compared to the asphalt sample.  Table 5 presents the results for both asphalt and bridge 
models focusing on the relative bids variable.  The asphalt results, in the first two 
columns, show there is no effect of the change in ECE policy on bids or winning bids for 
these projects in the post March 2000 period.  There is a substantial rise in bids in the 
transition period for asphalt projects. For bridge projects, however, the coefficients that 
measure the change in bidding after the change in ECE policy are negative and large in 
magnitude.  The results in column (3) show the average relative bid fell by about 9.6% 
for bridge projects.  The winning relative bid also fell by a similar amount though it is 
statistically significant at only the 10% level.   This differential impact of the information 
release across these project groups lends some confidence to the interpretation that the 
estimated differences-in-differences policy dummies are reflecting changes in the 
                                                           
15 These uncertainties are reflected in the detailed work items listed in the project description.  In bridge 
work, there are often unique construction tasks listed as “lump sum” items in the construction plans.  For 
example, bridge demolition is usually listed as a “lump sum” cost item with no detailed breakdown of the 
specific costs of demolition.   Alternatively, in asphalt projects an estimate of the amount of asphalt (e.g., in 
tons) to be used in a project will be clearly stated.  
16 Likewise, in an effort to categorize uncertainty in wildcat auctions, Porter (1995) concentrated on the 
large dispersion of submitted bids.  Based on the variance in bids, he concluded that these auctions could be 
“regarded as common value auctions, where firms are uncertain about deposit sizes, common extraction 
costs, or future prices.” 
17 This is similar to running a differences-in-differences-in-differences model where the project type 
dummy variable is fully interacted with all the variables in the model. 
  15information environment.  If the ECE policy variables were simply proxying for some 
other Oklahoma state level effect (e.g., budget issues), we would expect a uniform effect 
across these project types.  This is not the case. 
WITHIN-AUCTION VARIATION IN BIDS 
The theory also predicts that when the common cost component is important, bids 
become more aggressive and more concentrated when information is released.  This 
suggests the within-auction variation in bids should fall in response to ECE policy 
changes in auctions with a greater share of common cost components.  In order to 
examine this issue, we estimate an econometric specification where the dependent 
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The standard deviation of bids is modeled as a function of the ECE policy dummies and a 
set of auction and business characteristics. We estimate the model across all auctions and 
for the asphalt and bridge work auctions separately. The data only contain auctions with 
four or more bidders because we need to construct an auction-specific standard deviation.  
We also use the range of bids (maximum bid – minimum bid) in an auction as an 
alternative measure of the dependent variable. Table 6 presents these results.  There are 
two main findings.  First, the results across all auctions show a substantial decline in both 
the standard deviation and the range of bids in Oklahoma after the ECE policy change 
(Column 1 and Column 4).  Second, when comparing asphalt to bridge work auctions, the 
declines in the standard deviation and the range are larger in magnitude for the bridge 
projects.  This is as expected if the release of information is reducing the uncertainty in 
common costs and common costs uncertainty is more prevalent in bridge projects. 
QUANTILE REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
In our analysis of bids, we have considered up to this point differences in the 
expected value, the variance and the range of values. We will now show that the level of 
bids is consistently lower in Oklahoma than in Texas not only in expectation but across 
the bidding distributions.  We can thus provide additional evidence, beyond the graphs 
  16and the preceding statistical analysis, that the aggressive bidding behavior after the policy 
change is not due to a truncation of the distribution of bids at the upper end (for high cost 
bidders) but due to an informational effect that persistently affects bidding behavior at 
every level.  This fact can be formalized in the analysis of the quantile regression model 
(see Koenker and Bassett, 1982) that follows.  
This model allows us to estimate differences in the distribution of bids across bidders 
in Oklahoma and Texas before and after the policy change more accurately while taking 
into account other factors that contribute to the variability of bids. The advantage of 
employing quantile regression analysis at this point is that it allows a detailed 
examination of the difference between the distributions of bids not only at their mean 
level that could somewhat be driven by outliers but at the median, the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 7. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the relative bid. The analysis employs similar specifications 
to those reported in column 1 of Table 3 and columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 (without a full 
set of the fixed effects).
18 The estimated coefficient of β5 on the difference between the 
overall bids in Oklahoma and Texas after the policy change is the same in the .25 and .75 
quantiles. The difference across the three quantiles tested from the models in columns 1 
through 3 of Table 7 is statistically insignificant (F(2, 13216) =.350).  The bids in 
Oklahoma are lower than those in Texas by 4.6% at the .50 quantile, holding everything 
else constant. That difference is almost the same as the expected difference reported in 
Table 3 but it represents the effect at the median level of bids which is less affected by 
outliers. Notice from columns 4 through 6 of Table 7 that the difference in the estimate of 
β5 is statistically insignificant for asphalt work across the three quartiles and shows 
uniformly no difference in the bidding level across the two states after the policy change. 
When considering bridge work, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
estimate of β5 across the quantiles, but all coefficients are statistically significant within 
each model signifying a large and persistent difference in the bidding behavior across the 
two states after the policy was implemented. For bridge projects, the median bid in 
Oklahoma after the policy change is 13.6% lower than in Texas.  
                                                           
18 The model contains a set of individual firm dummies for the largest 35 firms in the sample.   The 
remaining firms are modeled as a common intercept.  We restricted the firm dummies to a manageable set 
for computation reasons.   
  17ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS  
In the remaining part of the section, we estimate a number of alternative 
specifications in order to examine the robustness of our results. First, we consider the 
possibility that the standard errors in our model may be underestimated.  While we have 
employed clustered standard errors throughout the paper to address the problems of 
within group correlation raised by Moulton (1990). Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004) raise the point that clustered standard errors are biased downward in panel data if 
serial correlation is present.  One approach that Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 
recommend is to collapse the time dimension of the data down to two periods – pre and 
post policy change.  In our application, we aggregate the pre and post ECE policy data by 
firm and project type. Aggregation by firm within project types will allow for differences 
in response to the ECE policy change across project types seen in Table 5, while still 
collapsing the time dimension down into two periods.  We require each firm to be 
bidding in both periods in order to estimate the fixed effects models and we drop the 
transition period data.  Column 1 of Table 8 presents these results.  The results are 
consistent with the model reported in Table 3 in terms of sign and statistically 
significance though the magnitude of the effect is substantially larger here.  This increase 
in magnitude is most likely due to the fact that by aggregating across auctions our other 
control variables are less effective at controlling for differences in bidding across firms.       
A second issue is whether the ECE policy variable is just picking up a declining trend 
in Oklahoma relative bids over time.  To examine this matter, we estimate the relative bid 
model using only data from the pre-ECE policy change period and include trend variables 
to measure the trends in relative bids in Oklahoma and Texas over this period.  The 
model includes an overall trend term and the trend term interacted with a dummy variable 
for Oklahoma auctions to test for cross-state differences in trend. The second column of 
Table 8 contains these results. The estimated trend terms are not individually statistically 
significant and show no statistical difference between Oklahoma and Texas.  Hence, 
Oklahoma’s relative bids were not trending downward prior to the ECE policy change 
either in an absolute sense or relative to Texas.  
We also estimated our models altering our clustering approach.  Throughout the 
paper, we have chosen to cluster by firm.  An alternative approach is to cluster by 
  18auction. This raises the number of clustering groups significantly (3608 clusters) and 
subsequently decreases the number of observations per group.  The third column of Table 
8 provides these results.  The ECE remains statistically significant and the standard errors 
are almost identical under both clustering approaches.  
A third test that we perform deals with a special group of auctions in Oklahoma that 
we refer to as repeated auctions.  Repeated auctions are auctions of projects that failed to 
be auctioned off in an initial attempt.  For these projects, bidders have a very good idea of 
the engineering estimate in all periods because in the initial round the engineering 
estimate is released and, thus, the effect of the change in ECE information policy in this 
sub-sample should be small.  We perform our empirical test by adding the repeated 
Oklahoma auction data to our Oklahoma-Texas sample and estimate the panel-data 
differences-in-differences model with a set of dummy variables that control for bidding in 
repeated auctions.  If the repeated auctions have the same pattern in coefficients as the 
non-repeated auctions in Oklahoma, then this would suggest that the time period effects 
may be picking up some other shocks that are specific to Oklahoma but not related to the 
ECE information policy change.  The fourth column of Table 8 reports the results of 
models that include the repeated auctions in our empirical analysis.  The repeated auction 
coefficients indicate no decline in bids in the repeated auction after the change in ECE 
policy.  A joint statistical test of the three coefficients cannot reject the hypothesis that 
bidding in the repeated auctions is no different than in Texas auctions (F (3, 491) = .300).  
However, one should be cautious here in over-interpreting the repeated auction test as a 
comparison to a randomly selected control group.  This is clearly not the case.  The 
repeated auctions represent projects that failed to be awarded in an initial auction 
primarily because the submitted bids were too high or because no firms bid on the 
project.  This lower level of competition in these auctions is reflected in the bidding 
statistics presented in Table 2c.   
A last exercise we perform considers the possibility that the actual number of bidders 
may not be the best measure of potential competition in these settings (Hendricks, Pinske 
and Porter (2003)).  In our case, the actual number of bidders is not known to 
participants. To see the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that the number of 
bidders is given, we re-estimate the model replacing the number of bidders with a 
  19variable that measures the expected number of bidders.  The expected number of bidders 
is constructed using information on past bidding history of all plan holders in an auction.  
The number of plan holders and the identity of the plan holders are known to all bidders 
before bids are submitted.  For each plan holder at time t, we sum up their past number of 
bids and divide this by their past number of plans held.  This gives a probability of 
bidding for each plan holder.  Then for an auction at time t, we sum across these 
participation probabilities for all plan holders in an auction and this yields our measure of 
the expected number of bidders.  Since the identity of the plan holders is known to all 
potential bidders, an estimate of the expected number of bidders can be constructed by 
bidders in such a way prior to the bid submission.  Column 5 of Table 8 presents the 
results.  The coefficient on the expected number of bidders is somewhat smaller in 
magnitude than that reported in Table 3 though it remains negative and statistically 
significant.  More importantly, our results on the ECE policy variable remain unchanged 
to this modification in the specification.  Finally, estimated models (not shown) on the 
asphalt and bridge work project samples using expected number of bidders instead of the 
number of bidders are also consistent with findings reported in Table 5.   
 
V. INFORMATION POLICY EFFECTS ON THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS 
While the above analysis has examined the direct effect of change in ECE policy on 
bids, another channel by which the policy change could affect bidding is through the 
number of bidders.  When the state reveals the ECE, it provides additional information 
about the cost and the likely reserve price of the project.  If bidders base their decision to 
submit a bid on this type of information, then the number of bidders is likely to be 
affected by the ECE, as well.   
Our current model, assumes that   =  dokafter x rbid dE / ] | [ okafter x rbid E ∂ ∂ / ] | [  and 
measures the effect of the change in the ECE policy by the estimate of 5 β . However, if 
the ECE policy variable also affects the number of bidders, then our expression for the 
policy effect on bids should be   =  dokafter x rbid dE / ] | [ okafter N n ∂ ∂ ⋅ + / 5 β β , where βn 
is the coefficient on the number of bidders in the relative bids model.  In order to estimate 
the effect of the ECE policy change on number of bidders ( okafter N ∂ ∂ / ), we estimate a 
count-data model (Poisson) of the number of bidders on the ECE policy variables along 
  20with a set of control variables.  These control variables include project size, detailed 
project location dummies, project type dummies, monthly dummies, and business 
condition variables. We also estimate a similar model using the number of plan holders 
(i.e., the number of potential bidders).  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report the results 
from these count data models for the number of plan holders and number bidders, 
respectively.
19  The unit of observation here is an auction.  Focusing on the post-ECE 
policy change parameter, we see that the post-ECE policy parameter is not statistically 
significant in the number of plan holders’ equation.  There is, however, a statistically 
significant effect on the number of bidders. The number of bidders decreases in 
Oklahoma relative to Texas in the post-ECE policy change period.  The magnitude of the 
effect, calculated as the average response, is a decline of .440 bidders in Oklahoma.
20  It 
should be noted that this is the relative average response in Oklahoma compared to 
Texas.  In fact, in both Texas and Oklahoma the absolute number of bidders rises in the 
post-ECE policy change period compared to the pre-ECE policy change period.  Plugging 
the estimates from the relative bid model in Table 3 and the average response calculated 
from the Poisson model into the expression   =  dokafter x rbid dE / ] | [
okafter N n ∂ ∂ ⋅ + / 5 β β , yields an effect of -.043={-.050-.015×(-.440)}.  We test the 
statistical significance of the overall effect using a Wald test. The Chi-square statistic 
from this test is 4.42 with a p-value of .036.
21  Hence, our overall estimate of the effect of 
the ECE policy change on relative bids remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
While the main concern of the paper is not on the number bidders, if the number of 
bidders is endogenous it may affect our estimates of the ECE policy parameters, the 
estimate of βn from the original equation, and therefore the estimate of the overall effect 
the ECE policy change. In an effort to address this issue, we re-estimate the model using 
                                                           
19 An assumption of the poisson model is that mean and variance of the distribution of counts is the same.  
In our application, the mean and variance of numbids are almost identical being 3.70 and 3.78, respectively.  
In a test of overdispersion, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no overdispersion.  This is not true in the 
case of the number of plan holders where overdisperson is a problem.  However, we do not use the 
estimates from the poisson model on the number of plan holders in our calculation of the overall effect. 
20 The average response for the effect of post ECE policy change on the number of bidders is calculated as 
the αokafter x N
-1 Σa exp(xi
'α) where the α’s are the parameters estimated in the poisson model. 
21 We estimate the relative bids and Poisson using a seemingly unrelated regression approach that allows 
for clustered standard errors and between model covariance in the estimated parameter estimates.  Given 
that the Poisson model is at the auction level, the models are estimated with clustering at the auction level.  
Clustering using auctions actually increases the standard errors in the relative bid model slightly more than 
when using firm clusters.  This is reported above in Table 8.  
  21instrumental variable techniques where our instrument for the number of bidders is the 
number of plan holders.  There are two requirements for a valid instrument in this 
application.  It must be correlated with the number of bidders and uncorrelated with the 
error term in the relative bids equation.  The number of plan holders is certainly strongly 
correlated with the number of bidders in an auction since it identifies the maximum 
number of bidders that appear in an auction.  With respect to the correlation between the 
number plan holders and the error term, we argue the number of plan holders will be 
relatively uncorrelated with the error term in the bidding equation.   
As we mentioned above, the number of plan holders and the identity of plan holders 
is known to all bidders prior to bid submission.  So, the number of plan holders is clearly 
not affected by the bids submitted.  Now consider an error structure that would cause us 
problems. Let the error term in equation (3) be εiat = µi + µa + µiat, where µi is a firm 
specific error component, µa is an auction specific error component and µiat is a white 
noise component.  The firm effects already included in the model control for the firm 
specific component.  The model cannot include auction specific effects because our 
interest is in estimating the effects of the ECE policy variables on bidding and there is no 
within auction variation is the ECE policy variables.  The endogeneity in the number of 
bidders arises if the Cov(Number of Bidders, µa) ≠ 0.  This says there is some auction 
specific factor that is uncontrolled for in the regression and is correlated with the number 
of bids.  For example, this could be due to some specialized input required to complete a 
project that affects both the level of bids and number of bidders.  However, µa is likely to 
be observed by a potential bidder only after the firm purchases a plan and, hence, there 
should be little correlation between µa and the decision to purchase a plan. Moreover, 
plans are very inexpensive costing around $25 for a project, so there would be little 
incentive for a firm to formulate an independent estimate of µa without purchasing a plan.  
Now it is true that when bidders see a high (low) number of plan holders they may bid 
more (less) aggressively but they do so only because the number of bidders is likely to be 
higher (lower) when there are more (less) plan holders in an auction.  We can think of no 
other reason why the number of plan holders should affect the bids submitted except 
through its influence on the number of bidders.  Therefore, we do not believe there is an 
independent plan holder effect on bids.   
  22The IV model is estimated using two-stage least squares with clustered standard 
errors. The third and fourths column of Table 9 show the results of this exercise.  Column 
4 presents the IV results while column 3 shows the results from the basic OLS model 
discussed earlier for comparison purposes.  As one can see, there is little difference 
between the OLS and IV results.  The Hausman test reported at the bottom of the table 
indicates we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS and IV models yield similar 
estimates. The results also show, as expected, that the number of plan holders is highly 
correlated with the number of bidders in the first stage regression.  There are two main 
conclusions we draw from this IV exploration.  First, it is reasonable to use our estimate 
of βn from the OLS in calculating the overall effect of the ECE policy change on relative 
bids. Second, the sign and magnitude of the parameters on the ECE policy variables are 
insensitive to the choice of IV or OLS estimation techniques.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions by providing an 
examination of the impact of the release of information on bidding behavior in 
procurement auctions.  Our analysis of the bidding data produced three main empirical 
findings.  First, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma declines 
after the change in ECE policy.  Second, bids drop sharply in bridge work but not in 
asphalt projects.  Third, the variation in bids falls after the change in ECE policy and the 
magnitude of this decline is larger for bridge projects compared to asphalt projects.   
These three results are in agreement with the predictions of the theory. The release of 
seller information generally leads to lower bids. In Oklahoma, these lower average bids 
do not result in lower winning bids across all projects and hence do not result in lower 
procurement costs, on average.  This raises the concern that the release of information 
may be affecting only the upper end of bid distribution.  However, the quantile regression 
results along with the basic patterns observed in Figure 1 show that the effect of the ECE 
policy variable is relatively uniform across the quantiles.  Moreover, in bridge work 
where we expected to see a larger impact, we do observe a decline in winning bids that is 
similar in magnitude to the decline in the average bid. Even after we account for implicit 
effects through a potential change in the number of bidders submitting bids, the effect of 
  23the ECE policy change on relative bids remains strong and statistically significant. 
Alternatively, we find no evidence that the change in information policy led to an 
increase in relative bids in two and half years since the policy changed. This is an 
important outcome to rule out as federal and state transportation officials have raised 
concerns that the releasing of the ECE estimate prior to bid letting may lessen 
competition.    
 
APPENDIX A 
Derivation of the bidding function:  
 
Consider a bidder's expected payoff from participation: 
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We can now show that the following function is indeed the symmetric equilibrium 
bidding strategy for bidder i in the first price auction: 
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Together with the monotonicity of B, this shows that B(si) is the bidder's unique optimal 
bid, i.e.,  
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  28Figure 1: Kernel Density Plot of Relative Bids on all Project Types for Oklahoma 
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Plot of Relative Bids on all Project Types for Texas 
Districts that Border Oklahoma before November 1999, from Nov 1999 to March 
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Figure 3: Ratio of Quarterly Real Volume to Average Real Volume of Projects in 
















































































































































Oklahoma Quarterly Relative Real Volume 













































































































































  30Table 1: State Policies on ECE information release 
 




No release before the bid letting - ECE release 
after 
AK, AZ, CO, DE, GA, ID, IN, KY, ME, MN, 
NM, OH, SC, TN, WV  
No release before or after the bid letting 
 
AR, IL, IA, KS, MD, NE, VT, VA  
Release of a range of values before- no release 
after 
AL, NJ, MO, WI  
Release of a range of values before- ECE release 
after 
CT, HI, MS, MT, NY, ND, OR, WA, WY, PA  
Release of a budgeted estimate before- ECE 
release after 
CA, FL, SD, NC  
Release of a budgeted estimate before- no ECE 
release after 
RI  
ECE release before 
 
LA, MA, MI, NV, OK, TX, UT, NH  
 






From November 1999 to 
March 2000 
After March 2000 
Total number of auctions 
 
698 143  1220 
Number of awarded projects  620 116 
 
1072 






























Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 






From November 1999 to 
March 2000 
After March 2000 
Total number of auctions 
 
527 108 913 
Number of awarded projects 
 
506 104 891 






























Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 






From November 1999 to 
March 2000 
After March 2000 
Total number of auctions 
 
53 27 60 
Number of awarded projects  27 20 
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Standard deviations are in parentheses.
  32Table 3: Panel Fixed-Effects Differences-in-Differences Estimates 
Base Model   






























Oklahoma bids  from  November 1999 to 


































Log number of bidders 
 




Log of engineer’s estimate 
 

























































































**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level-clusters are in parentheses.  All regressions include firm-
level fixed effects, five project class dummy variables, and 11 monthly dummy variables. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Asphalt and Bridge Work Projects 
Full Sample  For Oklahoma  For Texas Districts 
that Border Oklahoma 
 
Variable 
Asphalt Bridge  Asphalt Bridge  Asphalt Bridge 
Mean of the Relative 














Mean of the Relative 














Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
  34Table 5: Panel Fixed-Effects Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Asphalt and 
Bridge Projects. 
Asphalt Projects  Bridge Projects   




















(.153)     
.299** 
(.104)     








(.033)    
.005 
(.073)     
Oklahoma bids  from  November 1999 







(.055)     
-.059 
(.086)  










(.047)    






(.039)    
-.090* 
(.053)    









(.004)     
-.022** 









(.024)     
.052 
(.042)     








(.012)     
.009 
(.009)     








(.236)    
-.226 
(.174)    








(.004)     
.005 
(.005)      








(.004)     
-.000 
(.002)    








(.011)     
-.017 
(.012)     
Three month average of the real 







(.026)    
-.026 
(.038)    
Three month average of the number of 









(.078)     











**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Robust clustered standard errors using firm-level clusters are in parentheses.  All regressions include firm-
level fixed effects and 11 monthly dummy variables.   
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Bids from  November 1999 to 














Oklahoma bids  from  November 










































































Three month average of the real 














Three month average of the 





























**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include a constant term and 11 monthly dummy 
variables.  Regression in columns 1 and 4 includes five project type dummy variables. 
  
Table 7: Quantile Regression Estimates for Relative Bids 
Base Model  Asphalt Projects  Bridge Projects  Variable 




























































Oklahoma bids  from  November 1999 

















































































**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  The reported standard errors are bootstrap standard 
errors using 100 replications. All regressions include a constant term, 35 large firm dummies, and 11 monthly dummy variables.  Regression in columns 1-3 
includes five project type dummy variables. 






5 β β β = =
1)  Base model: F(  2, 13216) = .350 
2)  Asphalt projects: F(  2,  3910) = 1.690 
3)  Bridge projects: F(  2,  4534) = 1.420 
  37Table 8: Alternate Specifications and Robustness Checks 
Relative Bids   
Variable 
 
Pre-Relative Bids – 




























(.065)     
-.006 
(.063) 
Bids from  November 1999 to 
March 2000 (β2) 
   
    
   
   
        
        
      
      
      




(.013)    
-.037** 
(.013) 
Oklahoma bids  from  November 




(.023)     
.040* 
(.023) 































(.064)      
 
Repeated auctions  in Oklahoma 









Expected Number of Bidders  -.010**
(.001) 













**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and five 
project type dummy variables.  Columns 3—6 include 11 monthly dummy variables.  All regressions other than in column 3 report robust clustered standard 
errors using firm-level clusters.  In column 3 robust clustered standard errors using auction level clusters are in parentheses. 
 
          
            38 Table 9: Number of Bidders Analysis 
Poisson Relative  Bids  Variable 













Number of  
Plan Holders 
 (4) 
Oklahoma bids (β1) 
 




Bids from  November 1999 to 









Oklahoma bids  from  November 












































Number of bidders 
 










Distance to the project location 
 




Average rivals winning to plan 
holder ratio 




Closest rival’s distance to the 
project location 




Rivals minimum backlog 
 














Three month average of the real 









Three month average of the 









First Stage Instrument 
Number of plan holders 
      
.412** 
(.008) 


















**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  In 
columns 1 and 2 robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns 3 and 4 robust clustered standard 
errors using firm-level clusters are in parentheses.  The Poisson models in columns (1) and (2) include 14 
project location dummies, five project type dummy variables, and 11 monthly dummy variables.  The 
models in columns (3) and (4) include firm-level fixed effects, five project type dummy variables, and 11 
monthly dummy variables.  
  39APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
 
Table B1: Regression Variables 
Independent Variable 
 
Description and Construction of the Independent Variable 
Relative bid  Bid divided by the ECE. 
 
Relative winning bid  Winning bid divided by the ECE. 
 
Log of the Bid  The logarithm of the bid. 
 
Log of the winning bid 
 
The logarithm of the winning bid.  
 
Auctions specific standard deviation of 
relative bids  
 
The standard deviation of relative bids for a given auction. 
Auctions specific range of relative bids 
 
The auctions specific range is calculated as the maximum relative 




A dummy variable that identifies the bids in the state of 
Oklahoma. 
 
Bids from November 1999 to March 
2000 
A dummy variable that identifies the period between November 
1999 and March 2000. 
 
Oklahoma bids  from  November 1999 to 
March 2000 
A dummy variable that identifies the bids in the state of Oklahoma 
between November 1999 and March 2000. 
 
Bids after March 2000 
 
A dummy variable that identifies the period after March 2000. 
Oklahoma bids  after March 2000  A dummy variable that identifies the bids in the state of Oklahoma 
after March 2000. 
 
Repeated Auctions in Oklahoma 
 
A dummy variable that identifies the repeated auctions in the state 
of Oklahoma. 
 
Repeated Auctions in Oklahoma  from  
November 1999 to March 2000 
 
A dummy variable that identifies the repeated auctions in the state 
of Oklahoma between November 1999 and March 2000. 
 
Repeated Auctions in Oklahoma  after 
March 2000 
 
A dummy variable that identifies the repeated auctions in the state 
of Oklahoma after March 2000. 
 
Number of bidders 
 
The number of bidders in an auction. 
Log number of bidders 
 
The logarithm of the number of bidders in an auction. 
Expected number of bidders 
 
The expected number of bidders is calculated using past 
information for each bidder and the plan holder list.  For each 
bidder at time t, we take the past bidding to plan holder ratio.  This 
gives a probability of bidding for each bidder.   Then for an 
auction at time t, we sum across these participation probabilities 
for all plan holders in an auction. 
 
Number of plan holders  Number of plan holders in an auction. 
 
  40Log of engineer’s estimate 
 
The logarithm of the ECE for a given auction. 
Capacity utilized 
 
The utilization rate is the current project backlog of a firm divided 
by the maximum backlog of that firm during the sample period.  
For firms that have never won a contract, the utilization rate is set 
to zero. Data from the year 1997 are used to construct a set of 
initial starting value for the capacity utilization variable.  The 
1997 data is not used in the empirical models.  The backlog 
variable is constructed as follows.  For each project awarded, both 
the value of the contract and the length of the contract in days are 
given.  We assume that a project is completed in a uniform 
fashion over the length of the contract.  A contract backlog is 
constructed in each month by summing across the remaining value 
of all existing contracts in Texas and/or Oklahoma for a firm. So 
for both Texas and Oklahoma firms, the backlog includes all 
awarded projects in the states.  As projects are completed, the 
backlog of a firm goes to zero unless new contracts are won.   
 
Distance to the project location 
 
The logarithm of the distance to a project is constructed as the 
distance between the county the project is located in and the 
distance to the county of the firm’s location [log(distance+1)].  
The county location is measured by the longitude and latitude at 
the centroid of the ‘county seat.’ 
 
Average rivals winning to plan holder 
ratio 
The measure of rivals’ past average success (ARWP) in auctions is 
constructed as the average across rivals of the ratio of past wins to 
the past number of plans held.  This variable incorporates two 
aspects of past rival bidding behavior.  It incorporates both the 
probability of a rival bidding given they are a plan holder and the 
probability the rival wins an auction given that they bid. These 
probabilities are updated monthly using the complete set of 
bidding data in Texas and Oklahoma.  The probabilities are 
initialized using data from 1997. 
 
Closest rival’s distance to the project 
location 
This variable measures the distance (log of miles) between the 
project location and the closest rival.  
 
Rivals minimum backlog 
 
This variable contains the minimum the backlog of the rival firms 
in an auction [log(backlog+1)].  See the capacity utilization 
discussion above for a detailed explanation of how the backlog 
variable is constructed. 
   
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment 
rate 
The monthly state-level unemployment rate in Oklahoma and 
Texas from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Three month average of the real volume 
of projects 
This variable measures the three month moving average of the real 
volume of all projects for Oklahoma and Texas.  The real volume 
of projects is constructed by adding the ECE across projects up for 
bid in a month for Oklahoma and Texas, respectively, and 
deflating the current value by the PPI.  Then we divide it by the 
average of the real volume for each state to calculate the relative 
real volume. 
 
Three month average of the number of 
building permits   
This variable measures the three month moving average of the 
relative number of building permits for Oklahoma and Texas.  The 
data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
  41 
Project type dummies  All projects are grouped into six main categories based on the 
description of the project.  They are asphalt paving projects, 
clearance and bank protection projects, bridge projects, grading 
and draining projects, concrete work and traffic signals and 
lighting projects.  The dummy on asphalt projects is the omitted 
group in the regressions.  
 
Monthly dummies  Monthly dummies are set of 12 variables that control for the 
months of the year.  The omitted month is January. 
 
Project location dummies 
 
ODOT has divided the state of OK into eight divisions.  Similarly 
TXDOT has divided TX into 25 divisions.  OK borders seven of 
these TX divisions.  The project location dummies identify the 15 
divisions from which we draw data for our analysis.  OK division 
1 is the omitted group in the Poisson regressions. 
  
Note: All data come from the Oklahoma Department of Transportation and the Texas Department of 
Transportation except the state-level unemployment and building permits data that come from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively.  








Relative value of bids  1.068 (.288) 
Relative value of winning bids  .949 (.194) 
Auctions specific standard deviation of relative bids  
 
.133 (.130) 
Auctions specific range of relative bids 
 
.326 (.308) 
Oklahoma bids  .501 (.500) 
Bids from  November 1999 to March 2000  .073 (.260) 
Oklahoma bids from  November 1999 to March 2000  .034 (.182) 
Bids after March 2000  .620 (.485) 
Oklahoma bids  after March 2000  .308 (.462) 
Repeated Auctions  .029 (.168) 
Repeated auctions in Oklahoma from  November 1999 to March 2000  .006 (.078) 
Repeated auctions in Oklahoma after March 2000  .012 (.108) 
Number of bidders  4.697 (2.171) 
Log number of bidders  1.664 (.379) 
Expected number of bidders  4.525 (2.203) 
Number of plan holders  7.627 (3.747) 
Log number of plan holders  2.063 (.434) 
Capacity utilized  .238 (.272) 
Distance to the project location  4.207 (1.581) 
Average rivals winning to plan holder ratio  .149 (.054) 
Closest rival’s distance to the project location  2.871 (1.725) 
Rivals minimum backlog  2.380 (5.146) 
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate  4.621 (1.088) 
Three month average of the real volume of projects  1.065 (.362) 
Three month average of  the  number of building permits   1.019 (.157) 
Asphalt projects  .298 (.456) 
Erosion control projects  .009 (.094) 
Bridge projects  .355 (.478) 
Grading and drainage projects  .149 (.356) 
Concrete projects  .044 (.204) 
Traffic projects  .145 (.352) 
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